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LEGISLATIVE EXACTIONS AND PROGRESSIVE
PROPERTY
Timothy M Mulvaney*
Exactions-a term used to describe certain conditions that are attached to land-use per-
mits issued at the government's discretion-ostensibly oblige property owners to internalize the
costs of the expected infrastructural, environmental, and social harms resulting from develop-
ment. This Article explores how proponents of progressive conceptions of property might re-
spond to the open question of whether legislative exactions should be subject to the same level of
judicial scrutiny to which administrative exactions are subject in constitutional takings cases.
It identifies several first-order reasons to support the idea ofimmunizing legislative exactions
from heightened takings scrutiny. However, the Article suggests that distinguishing between
legislative and administrative measures in this context could produce several second-order con-
sequences that actually undercut the goals ofprogressive property theory.
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INTRODUCTION
Exactions-a term used to describe certain conditions that are attached to
land-use permits issued at the government's discretion-ostensibly oblige prop-
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erty owners to internalize the costs of the expected infrastructural, environmen-
tal, and social harms resulting from development.' There are two broad, source-
based categories of exactions: those imposed via case-by-case administration (con-
sider a permitting official determining in the course of an application review
that a specific applicant must dedicate an identifiable portion of land before
converting tennis courts to condominiums) and those imposed via broadly appli-
cable legislative formulas or schemes (consider a local ordinance requiring all de-
velopers to replace every acre of wetlands they destroy with two acres of newly
created wetlands). It admittedly is not always evident whether a specific exac-
tion should be deemed administrative or legislative; 2 for purposes of the princi-
pal issue taken up here, however, where one might draw the line between the
two is less important than one's acknowledgement that at least some govern-
ment acts fall into each category. This Article explores how proponents of pro-
gressive conceptions of property might respond to the open question of whether
legislative exactions should be subject to the same level of judicial scrutiny to
which administrative exactions are subject in constitutional "takings" cases.
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."' This language
has been interpreted to constrain not only physical appropriations by the state
but also regulatory actions, including exactions, that affect the myriad incidents
of property. As foreshadowed above, debate persists over the level of judicial
scrutiny applicable to administrative and legislative exactions in takings cases.4
In simplest terms, there are three possible combinations: subject both categories
to a level of scrutiny that is quite deferential to the government's stated regula-
tory policy, as often is required in regulatory takings cases outside the exactions
context; subject both categories to heightened scrutiny; or subject only adminis-
trative exactions to heightened scrutiny.
1. See, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit"As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Doctrine, 91 CoLuvs. L. REv. 473, 482-83 (1991); Mark Fenster, Regulat-
ing Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58
HASTINGs L.J. 729, 734-35 (2007) [hereinafter Fenster, Constitutional Shadow].
2. For a prominent example, compare Judge Richard Posner's decision in Coniston Corp. v.
Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1988)-where he concluded that a
city council's rejection of a site plan application over the recommendation of the city's plan-
ning commission was legislative-with Richard Epstein's article asserting that Judge Pos-
ner's classification of this decision on an individual permit application as legislative was
"astonishing" and "wholly unconvincing," and "[took] the common deferential stance in land
use to new heights." See Richard A. Epstein, Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Hills:
How to Make Procedural Due Process Disappear, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1689, 1697-98 (2007);
see also B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cty., 87 P.3d 710, 728 n.23 (2006) ("[S]ome
exactions are somewhere in the middle of adjudicative and legislative because the legislature
[may give] some guidelines, [while] the administrative body retains considerable discretion
as well." (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Inna Reznik,
The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 242, 266 (2000))).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. In a recent article, David Callies efficiently describes this legislative-administrative question
in the exactions context as a "key remaining issue" in takings law. David L. Callies, Through
a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 48
(2014).
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The first of these combinations is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.
Seemingly out of concern that administrative exactions present the possibility
for extortionate, targeted conduct by government officials acting in an executive
capacity, the Court asserted in the companion cases of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commissions and Dolan v. City of Tigard' that the government, as the
defendant, shoulders the burden of proving that administrative exactions bear
an "essential nexus" to and are in "rough proportionality" with the proposed
development's impacts if it wants to avoid having to pay takings compensation.'
These decisions have been described as imposing a form of heightened scru-
tiny.' Their tests shift the burden of proof away from the claimant and toward
the defendant government entity, authorize review of the relationship between
an exaction's design and the public goals in imposing that exaction (a tradi-
tional due process question, only more probing), and allow for takings liability
findings in instances where the economic impact of the exaction is quite mod-
est. But it remains uncertain-as acknowledged in the dissenting opinion of the
Court's most recent decision on exactions in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District'-which of the other two approaches takings law will
adopt.10
5. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
6. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
7. Id. at 386, 391. The government's ability to impose exactions was once largely unbridled. On
the history of exactions in the United States, see Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the
Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REv. 511, 516-20 (2012).
8. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Conse-
quences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 609, 622 (2004) [hereinafter Fenster, Takings Formal-
ism] ("Nollan's and Dolan's 'essential nexus' and 'rough proportionality' tests require courts to
apply heightened scrutiny to challenged land use regulations."); Charles M. Haar & Michael
Allan Wolf, Commentary, Euclid Lives: The Survival ofProgressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV.
L. REv. 2158, 2184-87 (2002) (suggesting that, in Nollan and Dolan, the Court "lowered
the bar ... for private property owners challenging government regulation of land" by calling
for a more significant level of scrutiny than had previously been required in land use cases
and placing the burden of proof on the defendant government); Otto J. Hetzel & Kimberly
A. Gough, Assessing the Impact of Dolan v. City of Tigard on Local Governments' Land-Use
Po'wers, in TAKINGs: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS
AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAs 219, 219 (David L. Callies ed., 1996) (stating that Nollan and
Dolan "clearly signaled the Court's determination to provide greater protection for private
property rights" through the application of intermediate judicial scrutiny); Donald C. Guy &
James E. Holloway, The Direction of Regulatory Takings Analysis in the Post-Lochner Era,
102 DICK. L. REv. 327, 346 (1998) (stating that the Court's proportionality test "represents
the application of heightened scrutiny"); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of
the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1651 (1988)
(describing Nollan as calling for a "closeness of fit between means and ends" and making sure
that "the burden of the regulation is properly placed on this owner"); Thomas W. Merrill,
Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENv. U. L. REv. 859,
868 (1995) (suggesting that Dolan's rough proportionality test "appears to incorporate ele-
ments of both less restrictive means analysis and cost-benefit analysis"); Frank Michelman,
Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1607-08 (1988) ("[T]he Court expressly endorsed
a form of semi-strict or heightened judicial scrutiny of regulatory means-ends relationships
in the course of invalidating, as a taking, the Commission's conditional regulatory imposition
on the Nollans.").
9. 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 2608 ("The majority might, for example, approve the rule, adopted in several States,
that Nollan and Dolan apply only to permitting fees that are imposed ad hoc, and not to fees
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Progressive property scholars generally are more amenable to understand-
ing property interests as contingent and seeing distributive consequences as a
core part of property than those who conceive of property through a law-and-
economics or libertarian lens. This scholarly camp is construed very broadly
here to include those writers who express confidence that recognizing property
interests can foster widespread common good but, in doing so, attend to the
ways that property also can be used to enhance inequality and dominate politics
and public discussions.i On this view, property laws are value-laden and, since
human values regarding relationships with others and with nature change over
time, those laws regularly must be reevaluated. There are several first-order
reasons why scholars who adopt this view might support the idea of immuniz-
ing legislative exactions from the heightened takings scrutiny to which adminis-
trative exactions are subject. However, this Article asserts that adopting such a
position could produce some second-order consequences that actually undercut
the goals of progressive conceptions of property. It may be that progressive
property theorists ultimately will decide to tolerate the second-order conse-
quences of adopting the legislative-administrative distinction. Only by con-
fronting these consequences, however, will that decision be ftilly informed.
Below, Part I examines the numerous first-order reasons why progressive
property scholars might support distinguishing between legislative and admin-
istrative acts in the exactions context, which has been done for government acts
challenged on due process and nondelegation rationales for some time. Such
reasoning is grounded in the checks and balances of democratic government,
the likelihood of reciprocal advantages stemming from legislation, and an aver-
sion to judicial usurpation of the legislative process.
This reasoning might be coupled with the more general concern of broad-
ening in any way the application of what could be considered flawed original
decisions. Though the details are quite fine, the basic Nollan/Dolan critique can
be summarized in the following manner: Nollan and Dolan accept that the gov-
ernment could deny the relevant permit application outright under the current
state of the law "unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the [claim-
ants'] use of their property as to constitute a taking"2 under the traditional
that are generally applicable. Maybe today's majority opinion accepts this distinction; or then
again, maybe not." (internal citations omitted)).
11. The authors of A Statement of Progressive Property, the centerpiece of a highly regarded and
influential symposium at Cornell Law School in 2009, of course fit within this group. Greg-
ory S. Alexander, et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 743
(2009). However, as I have said elsewhere, it seems more accurate to describe that sympo-
sium as seeking to give existing progressive understandings of property new traction in legal
scholarship and to encourage continuing work that delineates and clarifies the content of
these understandings in the present day than to describe it as setting out a brand new theory
or agenda. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Progressive Property Moving Forward, 5 CALIF. L.
REv. CIRCUIT 349, 354 (2014). Other U.S. scholars writing in this general vein include, but
are by no means limited to, Jane B. Baron, Zachary Bray, Nestor Davidson, Rashmi Dyal-
Chand, Eric Freyfogle, John A. Lovett, and Ezra Rosser. A whole host of scholars outside
the U.S. are doing the same, including Susan Bright, Hanoch Dagan, Benjamin Davy, Jen-
nifer Nedelsky, Lorna Fox O'Mahony, Richard Shay, and Andre van der Walt.
12. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1987); see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at
387.
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regulatory takings framework first discussed in the Supreme Court's 1978 deci-
sion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York." Few, if any,
would suggest that denials of the permit applications on the Nollan and Dolan
facts would constitute such a drastic interference, for the claimants in those
cases already were putting their respective parcels to significant use. 14 It is rather
peculiar, then, that the Court found it appropriate to apply heightened judicial
scrutiny when reviewing (and to afford the possibility of a compensatory rem-
edy for) government proposals that the applicant might prefer to the legal status
quo.s In this sense, cabining the application of Nollan and Dolan scrutiny to
administrative exactions amounts to a pragmatic effort to halt expansion of
what is perceived as an ill-conceived and dangerous roadblock to government
regulation in the land use arena.
In Part II, while I assert that the first-order arguments in support of ex-
plicitly recognizing the legislative-administrative distinction in exaction takings
law deserve serious consideration, I raise the possibility that supporting this
distinction could produce secondary effects that actually impede the goals of
progressive property theory. In this Article, I highlight and offer my prelimi-
nary impressions on two such second-order effects.
First, I suggest that the argument to immunize legislative exactions from
heightened scrutiny is necessarily imbued with a tacit criticism of administrative
exactions. Such tacit criticism could create a broader assumption of administra-
tive interference, which threatens to uproot some of the more progressive char-
acteristics of takings law. While eminent domain and traditional regulatory
takings jurisprudence currently afford wide deference to both legislative and
administrative acts, marginalizing administrative acts as regularly interfering
with constitutionally protected property interests in the exactions context could
have spillover effects on the many eminent domain and regulatory takings situ-
ations that involve administrative acts unrelated to exactions.
13. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). There are two types of regulations outside the exactions context that
are not subject to a deferential level of takings scrutiny, for the Supreme Court has asserted
that they, with some limited exceptions, amount to categorical takings: those regulations that
result in a permanent physical invasion, as set out in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), or a total economic wipeout, in accord with Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
14. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825 (concerning parcel used as oceanfront home); Dolan, 512 U.S. at
374 (concerning parcel used as hardware store); see also Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Rem-
nants of Exaction Takings, 33 ENVIRONs ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 189, 226 (2010).
15. See, e.g., Starr Int'l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 444 (2015) ("The AIG Board of
Directors decided that accepting the loan was a better alternative than bankruptcy."); see also
Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Pefialver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SuP. CT. REv. 287, 334;
Laura S. Underkuffler, From Bailouts to Bogs-Shaking the Takings Money Tree (Cornell Law
Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15-16, 2015), http://perma.cc/GL9B-
BY22. A more moderate claim than that set out in the text would suggest that Nollan and
Dolan are justified as exceptions to the rule handed down in Loretto that regulations requir-
ing the permanent physical invasion of property ordinarily amount to takings. On this view,
while the government usually would need to pay compensation if it simply appropriated a
strip of land or a public access easement thereon, conditioning a development permit on such
an appropriation would not require compensation so long as that appropriation bore an es-
sential nexus to and was in rough proportionality with the development's impacts. See Mul-
vaney, supra note 14, at 225-27.
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Second, I contend that a pronounced shift in land use policy toward broad,
unbending legislative measures to avoid the heightened scrutiny to which only
administrative acts are subject could come with significant social implications,
given that in many contexts only administrative processes afford crucially im-
portant attention to the affected parties' human stories. By human stories, I am
referring to the personal, political, and economic identities of those persons or
groups affected by resolution of conflicts over resources. To be sure, there are a
host of "rule of law" and related objections to considering identity when resolv-
ing property contests. However, in engaging with these objections, I contend
here that identity considerations not only are, in a normative sense, a potentially
worthy component of a progressive conception of property, but that, in a de-
scriptive sense, such considerations already are of relevance across select areas of
existing property law.
The conclusion argues that both of the remaining options in exaction-
takings law-subjecting legislative exactions to either a heightened or a defer-
ential level of takings scrutiny-pose serious challenges to fulfilling the goals of
a progressive conception of property. It suggests that, moving forward, progres-
sive property scholars might concentrate more readily on evaluating other po-
tential boundary principles in exaction-takings law as alternatives to the
legislative-administrative divide or even, more dramatically, reinvigorating the
admittedly uphill battle to reverse Nollan and Dolan in their entirety.
I. EXACTIONS AND THE LEGISLATIVE-ADMINISTRATIVE DEBATE
IN THE FIRST ORDER
For more than a century, courts consistently have distinguished between
legislative and administrative acts when reviewing a number of different chal-
lenges to land-use controls outside the takings context, including those
grounded in substantive due process and related substantive claims,'" procedural
due process," and the nondelegation doctrine.'" While the justifications ad-
16. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 683-84 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("[State] courts have repeatedly identified the obvious difference between the
adoption of a comprehensive citywide plan by legislative action and the decision of particular
issues involving specific uses of specific parcels. In the former situation there is generally
great deference to the judgment of the legislature; in the latter situation state courts have not
hesitated to correct manifest injustice."); Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263
(2d Cir. 1999); Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992);
Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1988).
17. Compare Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (concluding that the
City of Denver unconstitutionally instituted a roadway-improvement tax based on the indi-
vidual circumstances of each landowner who abutted the newly paved road without affording
those landowners notice and a hearing), with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915) (deciding that a state law imposing a tax on all real
property in Denver was sufficiently broad that individual landowners were not due individu-
alized hearings to challenge the assessments). According to the Bi-Metallic Court, "Where a
rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that everyone should
have a direct voice in its adoption.. . . There must be a limit to individual argument in such
matters if government is to go on." Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445; see also Nat'l Amusements,
Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 746 (1st Cir. 1995); Philly's, the Original Phila.
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vanced for this distinction differ slightly across jurisdictions, the consistent
theme underlying the greater judicial deference afforded legislative acts in these
contexts is that legislative acts are considered fairer-in the sense that they are
broadly applicable and enacted by politically accountable representatives-than
individualized exercises of government power by officials who evaluate specific
pieces of evidence in specific cases and are less directly constrained by the polit-
ical process. Interestingly, though, there seems to be similar consensus that tak-
ings jurisprudence generally does not apply a different, heightened level of
judicial scrutiny when reviewing administrative acts.19 However, heated debate
persists as to whether this legislative-administrative distinction should be rec-
ognized in the narrow but important corner of takings law involving exactions.
After the first section below sets out the basic contours of exaction-takings law,
the second section explains why proponents of progressive conceptions of prop-
erty might support the majority of lower courts that have addressed the ques-
tion in advocating that legislative exactions should not be subject to the same
level of takings scrutiny to which administrative exactions traditionally are
subject.
A. Situating Exaction Takings
While most agree that the Takings Clause originally referred only to un-
compensated physical acquisitions (such as the government's appropriating pri-
vately owned land to build forts),2 0 the Clause has come to constrain regulations
Cheese Steak, Inc. v. Byrne, 732 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1984). The distinction articulated in
Londoner and Bi-Metallic lives on in modern administrative law: procedural due process the-
ories provide a potential avenue of redress for claimants in instances involving administrative
actions, while a claimant "generally is not entitled to procedural due process above and be-
yond that which already is provided by the legislative process." 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-
Dade Cty., 338 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003).
18. The U.S. Constitution limits congressional delegation of power to administrative agencies by
demanding that Congress confine such power by an "intelligible principle" in the delegating
statute. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); see also A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). While federal courts gener-
ally have been quite deferential in enforcing the intelligible principle doctrine-meaning that
Congress in practice holds wide discretion to delegate policymaking to federal agencies-
state legislatures and, even more so, local legislatures (e.g., city councils) are given far less
leeway by state courts (on not only nondelegation but also state zoning enabling act grounds)
to confer policymaking authority on local agencies. See, e.g., PRB Enters., Inc. v. S. Bruns-
wick Planning Bd., 518 A.2d 1099, 1101-03 (NJ. 1987).
19. Significant debate continues on the separate question of whether the judiciary is or should be
subject to Takings Clause review when it modifies common law rules and, if so, what level of
judicial scrutiny should apply. For a lengthy if still partial listing of thoughtful recent works
on the topic of "judicial takings," see Timothy M. Mulvaney, Foreground Principles, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 837, 839 n.11 (2013) (listing sources).
20. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) ("Prior to Justice Holmes's
exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, it was generally thought that the Takings
Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property, or the functional equivalent of a
'practical ouster of [the owner's] possession."' (internal citations omitted)); William M.
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 782, 783 (1995).
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on the use of property, as well. Supreme Court jurisprudence directs lower
courts to conduct an ad hoc analysis that is quite deferential to the state in most
takings cases involving regulations on the use of property.21 However, in the
conveniently rhyming cases of Nollan and Dolan, the Court announced a shift
from this approach where the regulatory act at issue in a takings challenge is an
administrative exaction.
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission concluded that the conver-
sion of an oceanfront cottage to a large home would block the public's view of
the ocean.22 The Supreme Court concluded that the exaction attached to the
Commission's approval of that conversion-a public walking easement along
the ocean-did not alleviate the stated development impact.23 According to the
Nollan Court, the state must prove that exactions bear an "essential nexus" to
the impacts caused by the permitted development and for which it could have
denied the application outright in order to avoid takings liability.2 4
Dolan, handed down seven years later, involved a landowner's desire to
expand an existing hardware store and pave a gravel parking lot.25 The town
alleged that this development's expanded footprint would increase traffic con-
gestion in the area and lead to flooding problems.26 On this understanding, it
conditioned the requested permit on the dedication of a creek-front strip of the
applicant's land for a bicycle path and floodplain management. The Dolan
Court declared that, in addition to proving the "nexus" called for in Nollan, the
state must make an "individualized determination" proving that the harms at-
tributable to the proposed development are "rough[ly] proportion[ate]" to the
burden borne by the applicant via the exaction.27
Admittedly, there remains debate as to whether a specific government act
should be deemed a legislative or administrative exaction, or even an exaction at
all.28 Again, though, where one might draw these lines is less important for
purposes of this Article than one's acknowledgement that, in most jurisdictions,
21. As noted above, the framework for such an analysis was first discussed in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City ofNew York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). On the deferential nature of
the Penn Central analysis, see, e.g., James L. Huffman, Beware of Greens in Praise of the
Common Law, 58 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REv. 813, 861 (2008) ("[A]s interpreted by the
Supreme Court over the past century, [the Takings Clause] has seldom been an obstacle to
governments' regulatory ambitions.").
22. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
23. Id. at 841-42.
24. Id. at 837.
25. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994).
26. Id. at 381-82.
27. Id. at 391 (finding that "the city must make some sort of individualized determination"
regarding the quantitative nature of the condition).
28. For a recent decision assessing whether certain municipal inclusionary housing requirements
are exactions or non-exactions, see generally Calfornia Building Industry Ass'n v. City of San
Jose (CBIA), 61 Cal. 4th 435 (2015). In CBIA, the California Supreme Court declared that
an ordinance requiring developers of twenty or more residential units to set aside at least
fifteen percent of those units for affordable housing amounted to an ordinary regulatory
restriction on the use of property to benefit the general welfare, not an exaction, because
exactions are limited to development conditions that intend specifically and exclusively to
mitigate development impacts. See id. at 473-74.
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at least some government acts fall into each of these categories (legislative exac-
tions, administrative exactions, and non-exactions). If one assumes that some
government acts fall into each of these categories, then takings jurisprudence
must determine whether the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan applies to
each of those categories.
There is broad judicial and scholarly consensus that such scrutiny does not
apply to non-exactions. In simplest terms, then, there are three possible combi-
nations of takings review: subject both legislative and administrative exactions
to a deferential level of scrutiny; subject both categories to heightened scrutiny;
or subject only administrative exactions to heightened scrutiny. The cases
themselves readily indicate that such scrutiny is applicable to administrative ex-
actions. Therefore, the open question-and the one on which this Article con-
centrates-is whether the heightened scrutiny applicable to administrative
exactions also applies to legislative exactions.
The Supreme Court has provided very limited doctrinal guidance on the
issue to date, having denied at least fourteen petitions for certiorari raising this
legislative-administrative question in the exaction-takings context.29 Doctrinal
29. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Alto Eldorado P'ship v. Cty. of Santa Fe, 132 S. Ct. 246
(2011) (No. 11-50), 2011 WL 2705218; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mead v. City of
Cotati, 131 S. Ct. 2900 (2011) (No. 10-828), 2010 WL 5323977; Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 556 U.S. 1237 (2009) (No. 08-
1139) 2009 WL 663951; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McClung v. City of Sumner, 556
U.S. 1282 (2009) (No. 08-1102), 2009 WL 559324; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Drebick
v. City of Olympia, 549 U.S. 988 (2006) (No. 06-223), 2006 WL 2354951; Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Long Clove LLC. v. Town of Woodbury, 546 U.S. 1215 (2006) (No.
05-812), 2005 WL 3551096; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rogers Mach. Co. v. City of
Tigard, 538 U.S. 906 (2003) (No. 02-750), 2002 WL 32133655; Petition for Writ of Certi-
orari, Agencia La Esperanza Corp. v. Orange Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 538 U.S. 916 (2003)
(No. 02-638), 2002 WL 32133520; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nat'1 Ass'n of Home
Builders of the U.S. v. Chesterfield Cty., 519 U.S. 1056 (1997) (No. 96-656), 1996 WL
33439030; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ehrlich v. City Of Culver City, 519 U.S. 929
(1996) (No. 96-238), 1995 WL 17018491; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Vill. of Schaum-
burg v. Amoco Oil Co., 519 U.S. 976 (1996) (No. 96-343), 1996 WL 33438500; Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, New York v. Manocherian, 514 U.S. 1109 (1995) (No. 94-1560),
1995 WL 17047573; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lenox Hill Hosp. v. Manocherian, 514
U.S. 1109 (1995) (No. 94-1555), 1995 WL 17047635. The petition in San Remo Hotel, L.P.
v. City & County of San Francisco sought review on several questions, including whether
legislatively imposed exactions should be scrutinized under the Nollan/Dolan standard. Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari, San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323
(2005) (No. 04-340), 2004 WL 2031862. While the Court granted that petition, it did so
only to address a question surrounding issue preclusion in federal court when a state court
previously rules on a takings claim under state constitutional law. See San Remo Hotel, 545
U.S. 323, 334-35. As this Article went to press, the California Building Industry Associa-
tion filed a petition for writ of certiorari that asks the Supreme Court to address "whether
Nollan and Dolan apply to development conditions that are imposed pursuant to a legislative
mandate." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. City of San Jose,
No. 15-330 (Sept. 14, 2015).
In the Court's most recent brush with exactions, a four-Justice dissent chastised the ma-
jority for failing to wrestle with the legislative-administrative issue. See Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("Perhaps
the Court means in the future to curb the intrusion into local affairs that its holding will
accomplish . . . . The majority might, for example, approve the rule, adopted in several
States, that Nolan and Dolan apply only to permitting fees that are imposed ad hoc, and not
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tea leaves that do exist have generated three areas of dispute. First, some com-
mentators contend that the Court effectively already has deemed the legislative-
administrative distinction irrelevant given that the exactions at issue in the
Court's three exaction takings cases-Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz-were them-
selves legislative exactions,3 0 while others counter that the takings disputes in
those cases involved individual judgments about the applicability of those poli-
cies to particular parcels." Second, some assert that the Court's repeated refer-
ence to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny as applying to "adjudicative decisions"32
distinguishes not between different types of exactions but only between large-
to fees that are generally applicable .... Maybe today's majority opinion accepts that distinc-
tion; or then again, maybe not." (internal citations omitted)). However, there is a subtle
argument that the Koontz majority in dicta subliminally at least set the stage for extending
Nollan and Dolan to legislative exactions. At issue in the oft-discussed California case of
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City was Culver City's conditioning the approval of a rezoning
request on a recreation mitigation fee imposed ad hoc and an "in-lieu" fee imposed pursuant
to the city's "art in public places" ordinance. 911 P.2d 429, 435 (Cal. 1996). The California
Supreme Court found Nollan and Dolan applicable to the former, but not the latter. Id at
439, 450. One could contend that Koontz was signaling its disapproval of Ehrlich's legisla-
tive-administrative distinction by citing Ehrlich as a case holding that Nollan/Dolan can ap-
ply to fees (in addition to dedications of land), see Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594, but, later in
the opinion, only citing cases applying Nollan/Dolan to legislative exactions-and thus de-
clining to include Erhlich-when asserting that state courts in the most populous states have
applied Nollan/Dolan to fees without the "significant harm" forecasted by the dissent, id at
2602.
30. See, e.g., J. David Breemer, What Property Rights: The Cahfornia Coastal Commission's History
ofAbusing Land Rig hts and Some Thoughts on the Underlying Causes, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 247, 265 (2004) [hereinafter Breemer, What Property Rights] (discussing Dolan and
Nollan); Mark W. Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan and
Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 513, 539-40 (1995) (discussing Dolan); Michael B. Kent, Jr.,
Theoretical Tension and Doctrinal Discord: Analyzing Development Impact Fees as Takings, 51
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1833, 1861 (2010) (discussing Dolan); Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting
the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1040-41
(1997) (discussing Dolan); Deborah M. Rosenthal, Commentary, Nollan, Dolan and the
Legislative Exception, 66 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 4, 4-5 (discussing Dolan, Nollan, and Koontz).
For a particularly thorough discussion on the Dolan Court's classifying the exaction before it
as "adjudicative," see Stephen M. Johnson, Avoid, Minimize, Mitigate: The Continuing Con-
stitutionality of Wetlands Mitigation After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
689, 720 n.172 (1995) (explaining that while city policy required only that developers pro-
vide "sufficient open space"-a legislatively stated aim that officials met by determining in
individual cases the amount and location of the land to be dedicated-the Supreme Court
found constitutionally infirm not the amount or location of the dedication required of Dolan
but the legislative requirement that Dolan and other applicants dedicate any land at all).
31. The City of San Jose and a group of interveners recently set out this position in CBIA. See
City of San Jose's Answer Brief on the Merits at 46-48, CBIA, 61 Cal. 4th 435; Appellant/
Defendant Intervenors' Answer Brief on the Merits at 38, CBIA, 61 Cal. 4th 435.
32. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005) ("Both Nollan and Dolan
involved Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions-specifi-
cally, government demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to
her property as a condition of obtaining a development permit."); Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) ("[Hlere the city made an adjudicative decision to condition peti-
tioner's application for a building permit on an individual parcel."); see also City of Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) (Kennedy, J., plurality
opinion) ("[W]e have not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the spe-
cial context of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the
dedication of property to public use.").
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scale regulatory mechanisms, like zoning, and smaller-scale regulatory mecha-
nisms, like exactions,33 though others interpret these references as insinuating
that such scrutiny is not relevant in takings suits involving exactions that are
part of a communitywide plan and broadly applicable.3 4 Third, some scholars
33. See, e.g., James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zon-
ing and Other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 405-07 (2009)
[hereinafter Burling & Owen, Implications of Lingle]; Steven J. Eagle, Del Monte Dunes,
Good Faith, and Land Use Regulation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10100, 10103-05 (2000); Kent,
supra note 30, at 1861; see alsoJ. David Breemer, The Evolution ofthe "Essential Nexus": How
State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from
Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 373, 401-02 (2002) [hereinafter Breemer, Essential Nexus]
David L. Callies & Christopher T. Goodin, The Status ofNollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission and Dolan v. City of Tigard After Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 40 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 539, 563-64 (2007); Christopher T. Goodin, Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard and the
Distinction Between Administrative and Legislative Exactions: "A Distinction Without a Consti-
tutionalDiference,"28 U. HAw. L. REv. 139, 158-67 (2005). This position is buttressed by
the reality that each of the five state cases Dolan cited as the foundation for its rough propor-
tionality test involved what according to many scholars would be deemed legislative exac-
tions. See Mulvaney, supra note 7, at 539-40. However, the majority of lower-court opinions
to have broached the issue recognize the legislative-administrative distinction in exaction
takings law. See, e.g., McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2008);
Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 999-1000 (Ariz.
1997); Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 90 Cal. App. 4th 188, 196-97
(2001); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 691-92, 696 (Colo. 2001);
Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colo. Springs, 207 P.3d 875, 880-81 (Colo. App. 2008), affd,
220 P.3d 559 (Colo. 2009); Dudek v. Umatilla Cty., 69 P.3d 751, 756 (Or. Ct. App. 2003);
Homebuilders Ass'n of Metro. Portland v. Tualatin Hills Park & Recreation Dist., 62 P.3d
404, 408-10 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808-09
(Wash. 2006). But see Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 483 (N.Y. 1994),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109 (1995); Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton &Miami Valley v. City
of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 355-56 (Ohio 2000). There do not appear to be any occa-
sions since Lingle where courts have decided as a matter of first impression to apply Nollan
and Dolan to a legislative exaction, though three cases are worth noting. In Sezik v. City of
McKinney, a Texas appellate court declared itself bound by a pre-Lingle decision of the Texas
Supreme Court, Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. Partnership, 135 S.W.3d 620
(Tex. 2004), that it read as rejecting the legislative-administrative distinction. Sefzik v. City
of McKinney, 198 S.W.3d 884, 894 (Tex. App. 2006). Yet Sefzik's reliance on Flower
Mound is questionable in light of the fact that, in that case, the Texas Supreme Court af-
firmed an appellate ruling in favor of the takin gs claimant but stated that it "need not and
[did] not" actually decide the legislative-administrative question. 135 S.W.3d at 642. Dicta
in a Utah decision suggested that, prior to the enactment of a state statute codifying "rough
proportionality" treatment of all development exactions, Nollan and Dolan applied to both
legislative and administrative exactions. B.A.M. Dev. L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cty., 128 P.3d
1161, 1170-71 (Utah 2006). And in a recent takings decision involving not land use exac-
tions but legislation calling for the seizure of a portion of a farmer's crop in an effort to
control the market price of raisins, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "[slelling produce in
interstate commerce, although certainly subject to reasonable government regulation, is ...
not a special governmental benefit that the Government may hold hostage, to be ransomed
by the waiver of constitutional protection." See Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419,
2430-31 (2015). The extent to which this holding will impact the legislative-administrative
debate in the land use exactions context is not yet evident, though proponents of a strong
unconstitutional conditions doctrine are optimistic. See generally, e.g., Brian T. Hodges &
Christopher M. Kieser, Horne v. United States Department of Agriculture: The Takings
Clause and the Administrative State, ENGAGE, Oct. 2015, at 34, http://perma.cc/FZR3-
FST5.
34. See, e.g., Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 1, at 754-55; Fenster, Takings Formal-
ism, supra note 8, at 628; Benjamin S. Kingsley, Making It Easy To Be Green: Using Impact
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point to the Supreme Court's unconstitutional conditions doctrine jurispru-
dence as supportive of applying Nollan and Dolan scrutiny to legislative exac-
tions," while others contend that the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine
either is more appropriately applied in non-property contexts (such as free
speech cases)36 or "lacks a consistent animating theory" altogether." In the end,
Fees to Encourage Green Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 532, 560-61 (2008); Mulvaney, supra
note 14, at 212-14; Daniel L. Siegel, Exactions After Lingle: How Basing Nollan and Dolan
on the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Limits Their Scope, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 577,
609 (2009).
35. See Burling & Owen, Implications of Lingle, supra note 33, at 407-16 (arguing that since
Supreme Court precedent on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine before Nollan never
distinguished between conditions imposed by different sources of government-i.e., it does
not distinguish between situations where an agency official imposes an unconstitutional con-
dition and situations where Congress imposes the same restriction-there is no doctrinal
reason to side with those scholars who suggest takings law does so now); see also Breemer,
Essential Nexus, supra note 33, at 401-02; Kent, supra note 30, at 1863 n.145.
36. Some scholars in favor of a more progressive understanding of property than that favored by
the likes of Burling contend that the values underlying an individual right to free speech
(such as the expression values underlying a newspaper's claim to publish a story) are often
different from the values underlying the competing public interests in restraining that speech
(such as the public safety values underlying a government interest in silencing that newspaper
story for national-security reasons), while the values underlying an individual right to use
land (such as protecting A's autonomy to use her land as she pleases) are very often the same
as the values underlying the competing public interest (given that allowing A to use her land
as she pleases necessarily impedes B, C, D, and E's ability to use their land as they please).
See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, When Should Rights "Trump"? An Examination of Speech and
Property, 52 ME. L. REv. 311 (2000). Therefore, on this view, demonstrable "rights" should
be presumed to trump in the former case (i.e., the newspaper's alleged free speech right
should presumptively prevail over the government's alleged national security interest), but
not in the latter (i.e., A's alleged property right should not presumptively prevail over B, C,
D, and E's alleged property right that a given regulation aims to protect). Consistent with
this position, proponents of progressive conceptions of property highlight Lingle's deference
to predictions about the effectiveness of public policies relating to property made by legisla-
tures and agencies as illustrative of the Court's comfort that "democratic forces can counter-
balance attempts at coercion." See Siegel, supra note 34, at 611. Richard Epstein counters
that the Free Speech Clause and the Takings Clause are both concerned about the abuse of
government power, and, therefore, there should be no presumption in favor of regulation of
either speech or property. See Richard A. Epstein, Property and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U.
CHI. L. REv. 41 (1992). Yet even assuming Epstein's position on the unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine controls, it is not clear that application of that doctrine-even a "special
application," as the Supreme Court has described it in the takings context, Lingle, 544 U.S.
at 547-is appropriate in a case like Koontz, where the majority (i) held that no unconstitu-
tional taking occurred and (ii) remained neutral on the issue of whether the state had ever
proposed an exaction. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586,
2597 (2013) (concluding that "nothing has been taken"); id. at 2598 (stating that the Court
was not answering the question of whether the Water Management District "issued a de-
mand of sufficient concreteness to trigger the special protections of Nollan and Dolan"). John
Echeverria colorfully explains the Court's folly: "Justice Alito has implicitly adopted the
novel, indeed bizarre position that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should apply
even in the absence of government action that violates the Constitution." John D. Echever-
ria, Koontz, The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 27 (2014)
[hereinafter Echeverria, Very WorstJ.
37. See Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q 131,
146-47 (2014); see also Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUMI. L. REv. 473, 485-504 (1991); Mark
Fenster, Substantive Due Process by Another Name: Koontz, Exactions, and the Regulatory Tak-
ings Doctrine, 30 ToURo L. REv. 403, 404 (2014) [hereinafter Fenster, Another Name];
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there is no Supreme Court precedent so clear as to be binding on future matters
addressing the appropriate level of takings scrutiny in cases involving legislative
exactions, and therefore the Court's decisionmaking on this question is more
likely to be influenced by policy than by ruminations in prior opinions. The
next section turns to the competing first-order policy considerations.
B. Democracy, Reciprocity ofAdvantage, and Fiscal Discretion
Some observers suggest that the Takings Clause should be applied in a
manner that focuses exclusively on the extent to which government action
causes a detrimental economic impact to the claimant's holdings. On this view,
the burden imposed on a landowner by an exaction is precisely the same regard-
less of the process through which the exaction is devised and regardless of
which governmental branch imposes it.38 Many others, though, conceive of tak-
ings protections, at least in part, in process terms.39 And in a decision that has
been labeled the "polestar" of its regulatory takings jurisprudence," the Su-
preme Court offered some support for this position by asserting that the eco-
nomic impact is but one factor in determining takings liability.4 '
Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72
DENV. U. L. REv. 859, 869-79 (1995).
38. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 94 (1985); Breemer, Essential Nexus, supra note 33,
at 403; Breemer, What Property Rights, supra note 30, at 266; David L. Callies, Regulatory
Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changedfrom Penn
Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L.
REv. 523, 575 (1999); Steven J. Eagle, Judicial Takings and State Takings, 21 WIDENER L.J.
811, 839 (2012); Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal-Bridging the Legislative/Ad-
ministrative Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487, 501-21 (2006); James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of
Tigard: Another Step in the Right Direction, 25 ENVTL. L. 143, 150 (1995); Julian R. Kossow,
Dolan v. City of Tigard, Takings Law, and the Supreme Court: Throwing the Baby Out with
the Floodwater, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 224 (1995); Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 8.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice O'Connor, said as much in a dissent from the denial of a
petition for certiorari in Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City ofAtlanta. 515 U.S. 1116, 1116
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (differing from colleagues on the decision whether to review
the Georgia Supreme Court's decision that applied a takings test since proscribed in Lingle
to conclude that a landscaping ordinance substantially advanced a legitimate state interest
and therefore did not implicate the Fifth Amendment's compensation requirement). A few
lower-court decisions prior to Lingle pointed to Justice Thomas's dissent from the denial of
certiorari in Parking Association in concluding that municipalities should not be provided
space to avoid the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan by altering the source of exac-
tions. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (111. App. Ct.
1995) (citing Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc., 515 U.S. at 1117-18).
39. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS (1995); Daniel A. Farber, Public
Choice andJust Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279 (1992); Saul Levmore, just Com-
pensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REv. 285 (1990); Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and
Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REv. 1333 (1991); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination
of the Takings jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1892 (1992); Marc R. Poirier, Takings and
Natural Hazards Policy: Public Choice on the Beachfront, 46 RUrGERs L. REv. 243 (1993);
Treanor, supra note 20.
40. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326
n.23 (2002) ("Our polestar . . . remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself," which
call for a "careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances." (quoting
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
41. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
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Select proponents of a process-based view of takings law contend that with
both legislative and administrative exactions, the government is taking advan-
tage of the leverage provided by a specific development application to impose
the condition. 42 In the words of one jurist, "[a] public agency can just as easily
extort unfair fees legislatively from a class of property owners as it can adminis-
tratively from a single property owner. The nature of the wrong is not different
or less abusive to its victims." 43 But others offer several overlapping reasons,
which are briefly sketched out below, to suggest that the legislative arena is
significantly less likely than the administrative one to generate extortionate gov-
ernment conduct.44
For one, legislative measures are devised by the most high-ranking govern-
ment officials through a more transparent process with more political checks
and balances than administrative decisions. 45 As the California Supreme Court
describes it, "A city council that charged extortionate fees for all property devel-
opment, unjustifiable by mitigation needs, would likely face widespread and
well-financed opposition at the next election."46 But suspicions can arise where
discussions surrounding the parameters of individual permits are conducted be-
hind closed doors and anchored by lower-level permitting officials. 47 On this
view, the risk of coercive government action-or, as one court put it, "distribu-
tive injustice in the allocation of civic costs"48-Simply is greater in the adminis-
trative context than in the legislative context. "Judicial scrutiny," according to
42. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: How TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 143 (2008) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEG-
LECT]; Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, Public Use, and the Perfect Storm: An Essay in
Honor of Bernard H. Siegan, 45 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 609, 615-16 (2008). Deborah Rosen-
thal recently suggested that all legislative exactions should be subject to Dolan on their face
at adoption, though not as applied, on the theory that "the least intrusive time to challenge
them is upon adoption." Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 8.
43. San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 124 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting);
see also Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings Law,
47 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1513, 1567 (2006) ("The government can act with antilandowner
animus in the adoption of inflexible fees, just as it can in the application of a fee to a particu-
lar landowner."); Kent, supra note 30, at 1863. But see Michael A. Greene, Spilling Secrets:
Trade Secret Disclosure and Takings in Offshore Drilling Regulation, 17 RIcH. J.L. & TECH.
15, *49 n.194 (2011) ("[T]hough in exceptional circumstances a legislative rule could also
implicate concerns of pretext[,] a rule should not be fashioned from the exception here.").
44. Among other scholars who generally support progressive conceptions of property and have
promoted immunizing legislative exactions from heightened scrutiny, see, for example, John
D. Echeverria, The Costs of Koontz, 39 VT. L. REV. 573, 610-11 (2015); Daniel L. Siegel,
Exactions After Lingle: How Basing Nollan and Dolan on the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine Limits Their Scope, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 577 (2009); Ngai Pindell, Fear and
Loathing: Combating Speculation in Local Communities, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 543,
581-82 (2006).
45. See Echeverria, Very Worst, supra note 36, at 55.
46. San Remo, 41 P.3d at 105.
47. The five-Justice majority opinion in Koontz referred to the prospect of permitting officials
attempting to "circumvent[ ] Nollan and Dolan," "maneuver," "coerc[e]," "evade," make "ex-
tortionate demands," "leverage [their] legitimate interests," and "pressure [applicants] into
doing [some task]." Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591,
2594-96 (2013).
48. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 444 (Cal. 1996) (Arabian, J., plurality
opinion).
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David Westbrook, "bears an inverse relationship to the political accountability
of the government organ in question."49
Secondly, the generality of a legislative act helps ensure some measure of
reciprocal advantage. A rule limiting development to two stories burdens land-
owners subject to it by precluding the construction of tall buildings, yet it also
benefits those same landowners by, for instance, preserving their access to natu-
ral light and, more generally, the overall character of the neighborhood. This is
not to suggest that a strict accounting of the burdens and benefits of such an act
is necessary. The reciprocity of advantage lies:
[N]ot in a precise balance of burdens and benefits accruing to prop-
erty from a single law, or in an exact equality of burdens among all
property owners, but in the interlocking system of benefits, economic
and noneconomic, that all the participants in a democratic society
may expect to receive, each also being called upon from time to time
to sacrifice some advantage, economic or noneconomic, for the com-
mon good.50
In contrast, case-by-case administration necessarily concentrates on a very nar-
row subset of the citizenry by focusing on individual applicants. These appli-
cants are "without power to 'protect themselves through the political process
[by] engaging in logrolling to ensure that they do not receive an unfair share of
the public's burden."'
Lastly, exposing legislative exactions to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny has the
potential to threaten separation-of-powers principles by putting the judiciary in
the position of regularly micromanaging local governments' fiscal decisions.
Such judicial engagement could constrain municipalities' abilities to make re-
sponsible land-use plans for the future. For example, if each landowner were
afforded the ability to subject the individual application of a legislatively
adopted traffic fee program to heightened judicial scrutiny, it would be quite
difficult for municipalities-who hold a far greater understanding of local traf-
fic patterns and challenges than members of the statewide or federal judiciary-
to construct roads, for there would be no clarity regarding the extent of the fees
ultimately generated to support them. Comprehensive planning responsibilities
long have been entrusted to state and local governments,52 and crafting exaction
schedules that are categorically applied to a general class fits well within these
responsibilities.
49. David A. Westbrook, Administrative Takings: A Realist Perspective on the Practice and Theory
of Regulatory Takings Cases, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 717, 761 (1999); see also Karl Man-
heim, Rent Control in the New Lochner Era, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 211, 255
(2005).
50. San Remo, 41 P.3d at 109.
51. See Andrew W. Schwartz, Reciprocity ofAdvantage. The Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend
in Regulatory Takings, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 1, 39 (2004) (quoting Treanor,
supra note 20, at 871).
52. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
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C. Summary: The Legislative-Administrative Distinction in the First Order
The foregoing section suggests that there are sound first-order, policy-
based reasons for progressive property scholars to support the legislative-ad-
ministrative distinction in exaction-takings law, just as courts have done for
decades in the due process and nondelegation contexts. These arguments are
based on claims grounded in the checks and balances of the democratic govern-
ance model, the reciprocity of advantage stemming from legislation, and the
institutional advantages of cordoning off the judiciary from legislatures' fiscal
and monetary decisionmaking processes. In a practical sense, such an approach
could immunize from heightened takings scrutiny those exactions routinely im-
posed on developers via broadly applicable legislation, such as exactions stem-
ming from certain wetland banking schemes and solid waste impact fee
formulas. However, as discussed in the Part that follows, it seems possible that
broad adoption of the legislative-administrative distinction in the exaction-tak-
ings context could promote secondary effects that actually impede movement
toward accomplishing the goals of a progressive understanding of property.
II. EXACTIONS AND THE LEGISLATIVE-ADMINISTRATIVE DEBATE
IN THE SECOND ORDER
In this Part, I identify and assess two potential anti-progressive secondary
consequences of recognizing the legislative-administrative distinction in exac-
tion takings law. I contend in the first section that pressing the idea that legis-
lative exactions are significantly less likely to abuse property owners than
administrative exactions (and thus deserve greater judicial deference) necessarily
risks marginalizing case-by-case administration more generally, which could
have important ripple effects on takings law outside the exactions context. I
assert in the second section that formal acceptance of the legislative-administra-
tive distinction in the exactions context could prompt governmental entities to
retreat from employing administrative exactions and other administrative mea-
sures,53 a move that could come with substantial costs given that in many con-
texts only administrative processes can respond comprehensively to the
heterogeneous impacts of a given development project and afford crucially im-
portant attention to the affected parties' personal, social, political, and eco-
nomic identities.
53. While I concentrate on federal constitutional controls on government discretion in the land
use arena, there certainly are other mechanisms that control local government discretion to
impose exactions, namely state legislation, state courts, local ordinances, and the jurisdic-
tional competition for residents and businesses. For a particularly thoughtful paper address-
ing these alternative mechanisms, see Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 1. More
generally, Tony Arnold astutely cautions against viewing the land use regulatory system
strictly through a constitutional lens. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Structure of the
Land Use Regulatory System in the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 448-49
(2007).
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A. Marginalizing Administrative Acts
It is difficult to deny that legislation bears certain features that facilitate
fair outcomes. At least where the constituency is large, as James Madison fa-
mously explained in the Federalist No. 10, legislation often results only from
persuasion and interest group convergence. 4 In such an instance, as Carol Rose
describes it, all participating parties can expect "at least partial satisfaction." 5
Indeed, the nature of building coalitions minimizes the likelihood that one
group will use particularly harmful tactics against an opponent, for each group
is aware it may need a current opponent on its side in a later legislative cru-
sade.56 Moreover, according to Hannah Pitkin and others, the reality of multi-
ple competing interests forces legislatures to spend time reflecting on the
choices that most benefit the common good.57
It is of course the case that many observers (including Madison himself),
confident that such checks and balances exist where constituencies are large,
have expressed concern that such checks and balances exist where constituen-
cies are small." In short, they contend that small, localized constituencies can
be more homogenous than those represented by larger governmental entities
and are thereby more apt to generate corruption or factionalization.s It follows,
according to at least some commentators, that perhaps heightened takings scru-
tiny should apply in certain instances but not others, depending upon the juris-
dictional reach of the governing entity involved in a given dispute.60
But regardless of if or where the jurisdictional line is drawn, scholars across
the ideological spectrum are more suspicious of piecemeal regulations than
those that are broadly applicable. Yet even if one concedes that the risk of
coercive government action is greater in the administrative context than in the
legislative context, such a concession on ordinal rank says nothing about their
cardinal rank, i.e., the distance between them. The first section below explains
that takings jurisprudence surrounding both outright exercises of eminent do-
main and those government regulations that are the functional equivalent per-
ceives this distance as insignificant, for it generally does not distinguish between
54. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Harv. Univ. Press ed., 2009).
55. See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 837, 854 (1983).
56. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 54, at 60.
57. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 195-96 (1967).
58. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 54, at 58-59.
59. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86
IowA L. REv. 1, 26 n.105 (2000); Kent, supra note 30, at 1863. Rose eschews the very idea
of classifying local land use decisions as "legislative" or "administrative," for local government
actors, unlike administrative actors, are not impartial and do not possess particular expertise.
Rose, supra note 55, at 846, 849. She contends that any test of the reasonableness of local
government acts must draw upon the factors that "lend legitimacy and institutional compe-
tence to local decisionmaking," namely the regulated party's ability to exit the jurisdiction
and to have her voice heard within it. Id. at 846-47.
60. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1581, 1583 (1988); Laurie Reynolds, Local Subdivision Regulation: For-
mulaic Constraints in an Age of Discretion, 24 GA. L. REv. 525, 544-49 (1990).
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legislative and administrative acts in terms of the applicable level of judicial
scrutiny. The second section asserts that recognition of the legislative-adminis-
trative distinction in the exaction context would suggest that this distance is
considerable, which could have broad jurisprudential reverberations in the tak-
ings context, where many administrative acts currently are not subject to
heightened scrutiny.
1. The Absence of a Legislative Administrative Distinction in Eminent
Domain and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
Exercises of eminent domain are deemed unconstitutional only if the pro-
ject does not serve a "public use"-which, to many observers, now equates to a
mere public purpose following the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of
New London6"-or if the compensation paid is not "just."62 Some condemna-
tions result from broadly applicable legislation. Consider, for example, a land-
reform statute that sought to undo an oligopoly in land ownership on Oahu, a
goal the Supreme Court deemed a public use in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff63 But there also are exercises of eminent domain that could be consid-
ered administrative that are subject to the very same deferential level of public
use scrutiny. For instance, the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority recently
survived a public-use challenge to its condemnation of a vacant individual lot
for transfer to the nonprofit organization Habitat for Humanity. 4
Similarly, whether a claimant challenges a regulation as a taking of all
affected properties or as applied administratively to a specific parcel via a permit
denial, such a regulation will be considered a regulatory taking requiring com-
pensation on the same grounds. That is, a taking will be found only if (i) that
government act deprives a given landowner of all conceivable economic uses of
61. 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005). On the Court's equating "public use" and "public purpose," see,
e.g., Yxta Murray, Peering, 22 GEO. J. PovERTY L. & POL'Y 249, 259 (2015); Kellen Zale,
The Government's Right to Destroy, 47 ARIz. ST. L.J. 269, 293 (2015); Callies, supra note 4,
at 61.
62. See Shelley Ross Saxer, When Local Government Misbehaves, 2016 UTAH L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 2016) (manuscript at 35), https://perma.cc/KS48-NU5H.
63. 467 U.S. 229, 239-43 (1984). There are limited examples of cases where a legislative act of
outright condemnation was stricken on "public use" grounds. The most prominent decision
is County of Wayne v. Hathcock, which involved a local resolution to appropriate properties
adjacent to a county airport for development as a business and industrial center. 684 N.W.2d
765 (Mich. 2005).
64. New Orleans Redev. Auth. v. Burgess, 16 So.3d 569 (La. Ct. App. 2009). For a thoughtful
discussion of the case, see John A. Lovett, "Somewhat at Sea": Public Use and Third Party
Transfer Limits in Two U.S. States, in RETHINKING PUBLIC INTEREST IN EXPROPRIATION
LAW (H. MOSTERT & L.C.A. VERSTAPPEN eds., forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 30-31)
(https://perma.cc/BT6E-KASG.) Decisions striking down administrative condemnations on
'public use" grounds are rare. For one recently reported example, a state court concluded that
an Illinois town's plan to condemn one acre of privately owned property and pass it on to a
car dealership for additional parking to entice the dealership to remain in the town did not
constitute a public use. See Lee Filas, Judge Turns Down Eminent Domain Move by Fox Lake,
DAILY HERALD - ARLINGTON HEIGHTS, IL (Dec. 10, 2005), http://perma.cc/6KEQ-
5FEU.
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her property,6s or (ii) the factors set out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York66-which require judicial consideration of the economic im-
pact, the claimant's investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action-otherwise lean in the claimant's favor.67 There are a num-
ber of Penn Central cases involving takings challenges to legislative acts, and
most all of the claims in those cases have failed. For a representative example,
the Supreme Court applied the Penn Central factors to reject a takings chal-
lenge to a broadly applicable subsurface support requirement in Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis.65 But there are many more Penn Central
cases involving administrative acts, only a small number of which succeed. Jent-
gen v. United States" and Palazzolo v. State70 are two of the more prominent of
the many cases applying the Penn Central factors to reject takings challenges to
the specific denial of wetland fill permits."
2. The Legislative-Administrative Distinction's Marginalizing Effect
The preceding paragraphs attest that the same deferential level of judicial
scrutiny systematically is applied in eminent domain and regulatory takings
cases regardless of whether the state acted in its legislative or administrative
capacity. Pressing the idea that legislative exactions are considerably less prone
to interfere with property interests than administrative exactions thus leaves
open the possibility of contradiction in the many eminent domain and regula-
tory takings cases that involve administrative acts unrelated to exactions, in-
cluding single-lot condemnations, landmark designations, and ordinary denials
of permit applications, variance applications, and rezoning requests.
Of course, it is possible that recent Supreme Court decisions situating
Nollan and Dolan within the larger, mystifying body of unconstitutional-condi-
tions jurisprudence 72-and, perhaps, on the fringes or even outside of takings
jurisprudence"-provide a window of opportunity to recognize the legislative-
administrative distinction in the context of exactions but not in any "normal"
65. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
66. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
67. See id. at 124.
68. 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987). There are a limited number of Penn Central cases where a land-
owner successfully challenged broadly applicable legislation as a compensable regulatory tak-
ing. For one such rare example, consider Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d
1059, 1065-66 (N.Y. 1989).
69. 657 F.2d 1210, 1212-14 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
70. No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2005).
71. Friedenburg v. Department of Environmental Conservation, 767 N.Y.S.2d 451 (App. Div.
2003), is an example of the rare case in which a court applied the Penn Central factors to
award takings compensation when confronted with a takings challenge to the specific denial
of an individual request (here, a wetland fill permit). Id. at 458-59.
72. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Lingle v. Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
73. See Fenster, Another Name, supra note 37, at 409 (interpreting the Koontz Court to say that
the "Takings Clause . . . served neither as the legal basis for Koontz's claim, nor did it
provide the remedy").
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takings contexts.7 4 The simple message here is only that it might be prudent for
proponents of progressive conceptions of property to proceed cautiously so as
not to let several questionable decisions-Nollan, Dolan, and now Koontz-
prompt adoption of a position that successfully cabins those decisions (by limit-
ing their applicability to administrative exactions) but simultaneously opens the
door to courts' reconsidering gains already made in other areas of takings law,
such as the currently broad interpretation of "public use" applicable to both
legislative and administrative exercises of eminent domain and the prevalent
application of Penn Centrals context-dependent analysis in regulatory takings
cases involving both legislative and administrative acts.
B. Identity Considerations: The Lost Benefits ofAdministration
If the concerns raised in the prior section materialize such that eminent
domain law and regulatory takings law begin to subject ordinary administrative
acts to a more stringent level of judicial scrutiny than that to which legislative
acts are subject, the state's willingness to take any administrative measures af-
fecting property interests likely will be chilled. But even if recognizing the legis-
lative-administrative distinction in exaction-takings law does not marginalize
administrative acts in other areas of takings law, it nevertheless could produce a
chilling effect in the exactions context. While the discussion below will focus
on this latter, narrower context, it can be neatly mapped onto the former. The
background point is that limiting heightened scrutiny to administrative exac-
tions could prompt government entities to avoid takings litigation by increasing
reliance on the relative safe haven of legislative exactions, even where condi-
tions on the ground seemingly warrant an administrative response.75 This sec-
74. However, it can be very challenging to identify deal-making situations in the land-use con-
text that trigger the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. In a new paper, Lee Fennell and
Eduardo Pefialver contend that all of land use law-including, say, an act as seemingly
broadly applicable as zoning-could be construed as involving deal-making. See Fennell &
Pefialver, supra note 15, at 314-17. According to Fennell and Pefialver, such deal-making
(1) might stem from landowner feedback in the public-comment period on precisely where
to draw the lines on the initial zoning map; (2) might be intentionally built into the system
via variances, conditional uses, or related tradeoffs; or (3) might occur on a grander scale
through the legislative process, since lawmakers' decisions to enact or repeal laws commonly
are dependent on the enactment or repeal of other laws. Id. They critique the Nollan and
Dolan exercise, then, for focusing "on nexus and proportionality within the challenged deal
only." Id. at 316. Richard Epstein, among others, contends that almost every regulatory
action can be conceived of as conditioning some government benefit or burden on an indi-
vidual's action or choice. See RIcH4ARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 11
(1993); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE LJ. 547, 611
(2001) ("[T]here are an enormous number of government actions that can be creatively de-
scribed as exactions.").
75. There is some evidence that Nollan, Dolan, and dicta in recent Supreme Court cases (such as
Lingle and Del Monte Dunes) referring thereto already have generated movement in this
direction in light of the implicit support offered in these cases for the legislative-administra-
tive distinction. See, e.g., Fenster, Another Name, supra note 37, at 418 (including among
other "hallmarks of Nollan and Dolan" a "turn towards regulatory formulas and bureaucratic
caution at the agency level"); Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 1, at 772; Fenster,
Takings Formalism, supra note 8, at 645; Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of
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tion contends that the reduction in flexibility and customizability in land-use
law that would result from such a system could have important social implica-
tions by excluding from consideration the human stories, or identities, of the
individuals and communities impacted by specific land uses.
Before proceeding into the discussion on identity, it bears noting that
while it is possible that recognition of the legislative-administrative distinction
in the due process and nondelegation contexts may already be producing the
chilling effect described above, that chilling effect seemingly would be much
more pronounced and meaningful in the takings context for at least three rea-
sons. First, the more probing level of judicial scrutiny applicable to administra-
tive acts in the due process and nondelegation contexts is still quite deferential
to the state when compared to the strictures of Nollan and Dolan.76
Second, the principal remedy for an unconstitutional taking is just com-
pensation, not injunctive relief,n and, it appears from recent jurisprudence, the
compensation remedy in exaction cases is retroactive in accordance with "tem-
porary takings" principles.78 Thus, where a city issues a conditional permit and
the landowner-permittee successfully challenges the condition as a compensable
exaction taking, the city would be required to pay the landowner/permittee
compensation for the period of time during which the condition was on the
table, even if it withdrew that condition on or before the date of the takings
judgment.79 Given that compensation attaches to a self-imposed injunction-
i.e., withdrawal of the condition-in the takings context, whereas no compen-
sation is due when a court issues an injunction upon finding a violation of the
Due Process Clause or the nondelegation doctrine, government entities pre-
sumably will be more concerned about takings violations than due process and
nondelegation violations. If the legislative-administrative distinction is recog-
nized in exaction-takings law, the likelihood that fiscally conscious, risk-averse
governmental entities will resort with any regularity to administrative exactions
American Land Use Regulation: Payingfor Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REv. 177,
258-59 (2006); Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bar-
gaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 337, 366-68 (2002).
Many other commentators have suggested local governments choose this course. See, e.g.,
Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 21
J.L. & POL. 451, 465-69 (2005).
76. See generally Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact
on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REv. 605, 631-59 (1996).
77. See John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary Is Defferent, 35
VT. L. REv. 475, 482 (2010) ("If there is one thing we think we know about takings law, it
is that . .. the purpose of the Takings Clause is 'to secure compensation in the event of [an]
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking."' (quoting First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987))). But see
Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARv. L. REv. 1630
(2015) (suggesting that federal courts should be allowed to enter declaratory and other "an-
ticipatory" decrees in takings cases).
78. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Temporary Takings, More or Less, in CLIMATE CHANGE IM-
PACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAw: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 461,
463-65 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015).
79. Indeed, this is precisely what occurred on remand in Koontz. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, On
Bargaining for Development, 67 FLA. L. REV. FORUM 66, 68-71 (2015).
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(which would be subject to Nollan and Dolan's heightened takings scrutiny and
the associated retroactive compensation remedy) in lieu of legislative exactions
(which would not) seems quite slim.s0
Third, while the due process and nondelegation doctrines police both gov-
ernment discrimination against and government favoritism towards owner-ap-
plicants, the exaction-takings tests of Nollan and Dolan protect only against
government discrimination. For illustrative purposes, consider the case most
cited for the proposition that rezonings should be considered quasi-administra-
tive and, upon a substantive challenge, be subject to a more probing standard
than that used in assessing the substantive validity of traditional zoning ordi-
nances. In Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners," the county granted a de-
veloper's rezoning request against the recommendation of the local planning
commission, a decision neighbors challenged. 2 The court reached the conclu-
sion to apply heightened scrutiny out of concern that government entities were
too lenient on developers in individual situations at the expense of the public,
not that they were too demanding of developers to the public's advantage." The
point of offering the Fasano example is not to claim that Fasano's classification
of rezonings as administrative is right or wrong, but rather to demonstrate that
heightened substantive review of government decisions on due process and
non-delegation grounds includes outer bounds on both sides-that is, decisions
that discriminate against the applicant or favor the applicant both raise suspi-
cion. The exaction-takings standards of Nollan and Dolan, on the other hand,
are a one-way ratchet in the sense that review under Nollan and Dolan considers
only whether the government has, in the immortal words of Justice Holmes,
gone "too far" in serving the public interest,8 4 and not whether it has gone far
enough. Consistent with the reasoning noted above, a risk-averse government
will be inclined to step back from its use of administrative exactions when there
is no discomfiting takings barrier behind it into which it might bump.85
The foregoing suggests that if all exactions are subject to the same height-
ened takings scrutiny, government permitting entities will be more likely to
resort to a continuing mix of legislative and administrative exactions as they see
fit for the context within which they are acting (albeit of course at a rate lesser
80. In making this point, I assume that democratic measures hold government officials to some
account for their budget (mis)management. I am not contending, however, that monetary
costs are always wholly commensurate with political costs. On this issue, see, e.g., Lee Anne
Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 957, 994-95; Daryl J.
Levinson, Making Governments Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 345 (2000); Christopher Serkin, Big Diferences for Small
Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1624, 1644-65
(2006); Katrina Wyman, The Measure ofJust Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 239,
246-48 (2007). For the argument that local governments are particularly likely to be risk-
averse when it comes to takings liability, see Serkin, supra at 1665-79.
81. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
82. Id. at 577-78.
83. Id. at 587-88; see also Rose, supra note 55, at 862-63; Kenneth A. Stahl, Reliance in Land
Use Law, 2013 BYU L. REv. 949, 1004-05.
84. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
85. The distinction between monetary and political costs applies here as well. See supra note 80.
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than if Nollan and Dolan were to be abandoned completely).16 And, conversely,
limiting heightened scrutiny to administrative exactions could prompt the state
to avoid takings litigation by increasing reliance on the safer alternative of legis-
lative exactions. If one agrees with these premises, the question then becomes
whether an exaction system consisting primarily or even exclusively of legisla-
tive exactions leaves something to be desired. As set out in the remainder of
this section, identity considerations suggest that it does."
In remarking on a recent book that suggests the acts of "property out-
laws"-trespassers, squatters, pirates, file-sharers, etc.-actually can improve
regulation, Laura Underkuffler acknowledges that there are efficiency and recti-
fication reasons to selectively tolerate property law-breaking." But she suggests
that such selective toleration must involve an additional justification, for, firstly,
most property could be used more efficiently, and, secondly, acknowledging
prior injustice does not always and automatically allow the descendants of those
who suffered that injustice to take the property of the descendants of those who
perpetrated it." To Underkuffler, that additional justification is an implicit ac-
counting of the human stories behind the particular lawbreaker and her
objectors.90
Underkuffler is not alone in calling for consideration of human stories
when attempting to understand the meaning of ownership. Susan Bright,
Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Lorna Fox O'Mahony, Joseph Singer, and Andre van der
Walt, among other proponents of progressive conceptions of property, have in
86. It is conceivable that, given that both legislative and administrative exactions would be sub-
ject to the same heightened takings scrutiny, the state could refrain from using exactions
altogether instead of implementing a mix of the two. Cf Mark Fenster, Regulating in the
Post-Koontz World, 67 FLA. L. REV. FORUM 26, 27 (2015). Their prevalence over the past
century, though, makes this an unlikely course, and one that I will not take up here.
87. It very well may be the case that the benefits of keeping administrative mechanisms in the
government's toolbox are outweighed by the damning effects of subjecting certain types of
legislative acts to the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan. This Article merely suggests
it is important to give these benefits a full airing.
88. See Laura S. Underkuffler, The Politics ofProperty and Need, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
363, 363-66 (2010) [hereinafter Underkuffler, Politics of Need] (discussing EDUARDO M.
PE1ALVER & SONIA KAYTAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: How SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND
PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (2010)).
89. Id. at 366.
90. See, e.g., id. at 367 ("In the case of patent-breaking by foreign governments, there was little
save the HIV/AIDS patients' poverty-and the severity of their illnesses-that was argued
to justify the governments' threatened redistribution of corporate wealth."); id. at 368 (noting
that we are open to "toleration of a breach of the usual property rules in [some] cases ... not
because a man who is starving or freezing [subjectively] desires the property of others ...
[but] because his need to sustain life is recognized as justification for the bending of [those]
usual rules"); see also Laura S. Underkuffler, A Theoretical Approach: The Lens of Progressive
Property, 3 PROP. L. REv. 152, 156 (2014) ("[U]nder traditional American legal principles it
is often insisted-as a matter of form-that all property is protected equally, regardless of
the identity of the holder or the broader circumstances involved. . . . [However,] our in-
stincts-and the law-often demand consideration of the identities and needs of parties, and
the influence of broader social and economic circumstances."); id. (explaining that, under a
progressive property approach, "'[e]quity' in treatment and 'equity' in property principles do
not require that all borrowers be treated alike, regardless of whether they will be forced by
foreclosure to live on the street or to simply lose a property bought for pure speculation").
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varying ways raised similar themes in recent work." Bright explores whether, in
the context of dispossession cases, lawmakers might consider "the importance
of this home to this person."92 Dyal-Chand advocates tying legal claims to an
"individualized portrait of the parties pursuing those claims" to expose and pro-
tect "subaltern voices."93 O'Mahony supports the perspective that law must al-
ways have subjects and that those subjects should not be de-personalized to the
point where they are concealed beneath a facade of apoliticism.9 4 Singer, in the
course of contemplating the contours of a "free and democratic society that
treats each person with equal concern and respect," renews his call for consider-
ation of social power dynamics in assessing reliance interests." And van der
Walt asserts:
[W]e tend to forget that individuals and communities find them-
selves in the margins of the property regime and of society for a vari-
ety of reasons-some because they are indeed socially weak . . . ;
some because they have been deliberately marginalized by society
through unjust social, economic or political processes . . . ; others
because of natural or economic disaster [and] still others by
choice . . . . In a free and open democratic society that values plurality
and difference, the impact and meaning of the property regime on
each of these groups should be considered when we ask whether the
property regime is just and whether it needs to be changed or
transformed.96
91. Hanoch Dagan could very well be included on this list, though his approach is more cautious
than that of those scholars listed in the text. Dagan has suggested a method of using the
diminution-in-value test in regulatory takings law as a "proxy" for identity considerations, or
what he calls "an overt (and problematic) consideration of the socioeconomic status of the
affected landowner." See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive justice, 85 VA. L. REV.
741, 746, 782-83, 798 (1999). Dagan does not explain why this indirect, proxy approach is
preferred to an overt approach, other than to suggest that it will be more palatable overall
because some people either may not know that identity is being considered or otherwise may
be able to pretend that it is not. Id. at 782 ("Frequently, when we feel uneasy about the types
of factors that decision-makers take into account in their decisions, we use proxies.").
92. Susan Bright, Dispossession for Arrears: The Weights ofHome in English Law, in THE IDEA OF
HOME IN LAw: DISPLACEMENT AND DISPOSSESSION 13, 13 (Lorna Fox O'Mahony &
James A. Sweeney eds., 2011).
93. Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Pragmatism and Postcolonialism: Protecting Non-Owners in Property
Law, 63 AM. U. L. REv. 1683, 1742-45 (2014).
94. See generally Lorna Fox O'Mahony, Property Outsiders and the Hidden Politics ofDoctrinalism,
67 CURRENT LEGAL PROBs. 409 (2014).
95. See Joseph W. Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1301-03
(2014); Joseph W. Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law, 47
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 141, 142 (2012); see also Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest
in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611 (1988) [hereinafter Singer, Reliance Interest].
96. ANDRE VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS 233 (2009); see also Andre van der
Walt, The Modest Systemic Status of Property Rights, 1 J.L. PROP. & Soc'Y 15, 92 (2014)
(suggesting that life, dignity, and equality rights are systematically prioritized over property
rights, and other non-property rights often are deemed at least presumptively superior to
property rights).
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Inspired by this work, I outlined in a recent essay my preliminary thoughts
on the idea that some ownership interests may enjoy more protection than
others due to the identities of those persons implicated by a given declaration of
a property right." I will reserve a full-throated defense of the identity thesis for
future work, as my claim in this section is only that, to the extent progressive
property scholars see some form of identity considerations as important, such consid-
erations may fall by the wayside if legislative exactions are subject to a lower
level of judicial scrutiny than administrative exactions in takings cases. Still, I
will dedicate a modest amount of space in the first section below to sketch some
of the basic parameters and criticisms of identity considerations to illustrate, as
set out in the second section, that proponents of progressive conceptions of
property may need to sacrifice something of value if they choose to advocate for
the legislative-administrative distinction in exaction takings law.
1. Considering Identity
The idea that lawmakers should be attentive to implicated parties' stories
when fashioning property standards and resolving property disputes does not
simply suggest that, after considering wealth effects, the party assigning greater
economic value to some land or personal item should prevail." Rather, it sug-
gests considering individual human stories in their full complexity, concentrat-
ing, for instance, not only on individuals' present status, established property
holdings, and current wealth, but also on (i) individuals' and communities' per-
sonal, social, political, and economic identities that have impacted their life
courses and relations to property law to date, and (ii) the overall effects of con-
tinuing to recognize those property holdings presently in place. Undertaking
this course departs from the premise that property is, at least principally, a story
about owners, and that acts of owners on behalf of vulnerable populations thus
result only outside of property law and at some later point in time via the own-
ers' acting out of altruism, mercy, or guilt.99 Instead, this course starts from the
premise that ownership can be morally justified only if it offers widespread ben-
efits to owners and non-owners.oo That is, ownership and non-ownership
should orbit around identity, not the other way around.
97. Mulvaney, supra note 11. The next several paragraphs draw heavily from this recent work.
98. Id. at 367.
99. See JOSEPH W. SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD 47 (2001) ("The obligation to care for
those in need is not a matter of charity. It is not a matter of generosity alone or pity or
selflessness.. . . The duty to provide support for those in need is a matter of justice, not a
matter of choice."); Gregory Alexander, Socio-Economic Rights in American Perspective: The
Tradition ofAnti-Paternalism in American Constitutional Thought, in THEORIES OF SOCIAL
AND EcoNoMic JUSTICE 6, 18-25 (Andre van der Walt ed., 2005); Thomas Ross, The
Rhetoric ofPoverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L. 1499, 1502-09 (1991);
Joseph W. Singer, After the Flood: Equality & Humanity in Property Regimes, 52 Lov. L.
REv. 243, 314 (2006) [hereinafter Singer, After the Flood] ("[We must avoid cruelty to those
who are in dire straits by withholding necessities, making them feel guilty or humiliated by
the need to rely on others.").
100. See JOSEPH W. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT 209 (2000) ("Because each individual is of infinite
worth and deserving of respect and common decency, entitlements can only be justified to
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On a very general level, the notion of explicitly considering identity in real
property law admittedly may, at least initially, cause one to shudder, for it can
clash with the common perception that property promotes the singular values
of economic productivity, security, and stability.10 This common perception
about the personal and social-economic importance of ownership regularly
translates into a presumptive power on behalf of individual owners, whose
rights, on this view, are ordinarily immune from competitive interference by
non-owners. 102
However, lawmakers can define ownership in many ways,103 and fashion-
ing rules or standards on the meaning of ownership therefore inevitably requires
lawmakers to make value choices. The common perception that property is
necessary and justified because it serves the values of productivity, security, and
stability, while holding powerful rhetorical force, is inaccurate. This perception
fails to acknowledge that ownership is regularly subject to qualifications and
deviations in service of both other people and other values, such as those related
to human dignity, social obligations, democratic governance, community rela-
tionships, and biodiversity.104 The current set of property rules resulted from
value choices; therefore, continuing open conversations about the reasons for
preferring one set of rules or standards over the alternatives are paramount.105
Given that there are almost always interests on the side of the claimant owner
and on the side of everyone else (including other owners and non-owners)
when considering the meaning of ownership,106 the unavoidable task for
the extent they are compatible with the legitimate interests of others."); Jeremy Waldron,
Property, Justification and Need, 6 CAN. J.L. &JuRIs. 185, 195-96 (1993) (explaining that an
individual's ownership rights impose duties on all others not to interfere with those rights
without that individual's permission, such that to believe that a certain right is "a good sort
of right to recognize in our society" is to believe that the correlative duty "is a good sort of
duty to impose"). On the propriety of widespread ownership, see Frank 1. Michelman, Liber-
ties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 91, 99-101 (1992); Joseph
W. Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CAN. J.L. & JuRus. 217,
241-43 (1993). On the many ways that private ownership both can benefit and disadvantage
non-owners, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Ownership and Human Flourishing: An Explora-
tory Overview, 24 STELLENBOSCH L. REv. 430, 435-40 (2013) (explaining, for example,
that "[p]roperty's ability to encourage economic activity" can promote human flourishing for
tenants and employees, but, in a world of scarcity, owners also can extract the benefits of
land by charging non-owners exorbitant sums to use the land or paying them minimal wages
to work the land).
101. Proponents of progressive conceptions of property have offered a variety of labels for this
conventional perception of property. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 100, at 3-5 ("ownership
model"); LAURA UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 38-42 (2003) ("common con-
ception"); VAN DER WALT, supra note 96, at 27-41 ("rights paradigm").
102. See SINGER, supra note 100, at 6 ("If property means ownership, and if ownership means
power without obligation, then we have created a framework for thinking about property
that privileges a certain form of life-the life of the owner.").
103. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 102 (2010);
Singer & Beermann, supra note 100, at 228-30.
104. See SINGER, supra note 100, at 3; Alexander, supra note 99, at 7-8; Freyfogle, supra note 100,
at 430.
105. See Mulvaney, supra note 11, at 359.
106. See, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL PosrIoNs 201
(1978) (juxtaposing the "individual right to exclude" with the "individual right to equal ac-
162 [Vol. 40
2016] Legislative Exactions 163
lawmakers is to decide which actions to safeguard and which actions to
restrain.10 7
On this latter, more progressive view, there seemingly is space for explicit
identity considerations in property discussions. This claim is not meant to sug-
gest that property law is the primary catalyst for promoting justice; at the same
time, it does not see property law's place as insignificant.0 Indeed, human need
already is a factor in many areas of property law. Rent-control measures trig-
gered by an individual's extreme hardship are one obvious illustration, though a
variety of property-related means-tested programs-such as welfare, social se-
curity, disability benefits, health care, progressive income taxes, and myriad
subsidies-fit the description as well.1 09 While these examples might be con-
strued as distributing the responsibility for attending to such hardships quite
broadly (as occurs with legislative exactions), there also are at least select exam-
ples of hardship-focused protections that result in more individualized imposi-
tions of responsibility (as occurs with administrative exactions).
For a more specific illustration, one might consider what recently tran-
spired in a lawsuit involving a homeless encampment in the town of Lakewood,
New Jersey. At its peak population, nearly 150 people resided in tents, under
tarps, and beneath makeshift structures on two acres of municipally owned
woodlands.n0 Under the common conception of property outlined above, Lake-
wood's "Tent City" offers a remarkably simple case: the town holds an owner-
ship right and the residents do not. Therefore, the town is entitled to a speedy
eviction of these trespassing residents at the time of its choosing. And yet the
state trial court judge charged with evaluating the town's motion for summary
eviction saw the matter differently.
The Honorable Joseph Foster proved sympathetic to claims such as those
from a resident who allegedly had slept on a train-station bench for more than
eleven years before joining Tent City, and argued that "there's just no other
cess"); Singer, After the Flood, supra note 99, at 258 ("[R]egulations are generally designed to
limit one person's freedom to protect another's freedom. In such cases, the question is not
whether government should intervene but on whose behalf it should do so."). Non-property
rights, such as free speech, are not rivalrous in this sense. See Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund,
Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1033, 1039 (1996).
107. See Mulvaney, supra note 11, at 360-61.
108. See id at'358 n.38; Andre van der Walt, Property, SocialJustice and Citizenship: Property Law
in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 19 STELLENBOSCH L. REv. 325, 344 (2008) (expressing hope
"that property, among other institutions and practices, can foster democratic forms of gov-
ernance, advance social justice, promote citizenship, build sustainable and supportive com-
munities, and enhance stewardship of the global environment and its natural resources"). For
the contrary perspective that, to the extent property rights produce inequality society finds
unacceptable, such issues should be addressed solely through tax and transfer policies, see,
e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). Responding directly to
Kaplow and Shavell, Singer notes that "[a] property system that denies some people the
chance to participate in the national economy, except as recipients of public charity, strips
them of basic human dignity." SINGER, supra note 100, at 163.
109. See Underkuffler, Politics of Need, supra note 88, at 369-70.
110. See Narmeen Choudhury, Officials Dismantle NJ "Tent City,"PIX11 (July 1, 2014), http://per
ma.cc/D57K-DTQE; Kevin Pent6n, Tent City in Lakewood to Close, DAILY REc. (May 29,
2014), http://perma.cc/R5T9-6A5F.
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place to go right now.""' Judge Foster pointed to resident certifications that
alleged the town not only acquiesced in the occupation of the land, but actively
encouraged continued occupation; indeed, some of these certifications sug-
gested that township police drove individuals to Tent City when they had no
other place to put them"2 and the individuals had no options of their own.n 3
He denied the town's motion seeking immediate ejectment "given this history"
of the town's failure to attend sufficiently to providing shelter to all individuals
within its borders and in light of the fact that "one could easily conclude that
people have changed their life circumstances in reliance upon the position taken
by the township."11 4 In so doing, Judge Foster noted that in these types of
situations "there is a governmental responsibility . . . to provide for the poor"
that cannot summarily be disregarded when determining the meaning of
ownership."s
The suggestion that identity should be included in discussions on the
crafting of property standards and in attempting to resolve property disputes
like that at issue in Lakewood is not meant to negate wholesale the stabilizing
influence of secure property rights. Indeed, the approach discussed here con-
111. Judge Rules in Favor of Lakewood Tent City, CBS N.Y. (Jan. 6, 2012), http://perma.cc/
JW2D-U32K.
112. Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment at 10-11, Lakewood Township v. Brigham,
No. L-2462-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 6, 2012), https://perma.cc/V3SX-NV5Z.
This claim by select Tent City residents bears the markings of Bruce Ackerman's support for
approaches that take the specific nature of the owner-occupant relationship into account. See
Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes,
Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1173 (1971) ("[O]ne
may affirmatively argue that in a society in which wealth is unjustly distributed it is fair to
impose a requirement of decency upon those in the relatively privileged classes who engage
in long-lasting relationships with the impoverished."). More recently, Jedediah Purdy has
advanced a similar idea in contending that property law includes "terms of recruitment," or
qualitative, democratic conditions on which people enter into long-term, collaborative rela-
tionships with others. See Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in
the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE LJ. 1047, 1094-98 (2007).
113. See Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 112 at 13. At oral argument on
the motion of summary judgment, counsel for the residents of Tent City, in requesting delay
of the ejectment action until the city provided emergency shelter, plainly asserted, "We're
not fighting for the right to stay indefinitely in the woods. None of my clients want to live in
the woods in the winter." Id.
114. Id. at 11. Lorna Fox O'Mahony has suggested that creditors bear a similar delay in enforce-
ment of their right to eviction to satisfy debts in light of the home interests of occupiers.
LORNA Fox, CONCEPTUALISING HOME: THEORIES, LAW, AND POLICIES 79-96 (2006).
115. See Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 112, at 19 (emphasis added).
Judge Foster's opinion, steeped as it is in language of history, circumstance, and responsibil-
ity, is reminiscent of (if more broad-ranging than) the 1992 federal court decision in Pottin-
ger v. City ofMiami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The Pottinger court found that the
City of Miami could not arrest homeless people for "harmless, life-sustaining conduct," id. at
1561, defined in the subsequent consent decree to include "[p]ublic nudity where necessary
to carry on the daily necessities of life, such as bathing or responding to a call of nature,"
Settlement Agreement at 9, Pottinger v. City of Miami, No. 88-2406 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27,
1998), https://perma.cc/9GPS-7YU8. The decision did not impede continued enforcement
of the city's prohibition on public urination against members of less vulnerable populations.
See, e.g., Former Dolphin Tyrell Johnson Arrested for Peeing in Public on Miami Beach, MIAMI
NEW TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://perma.cc/S8RF-BHJ3 (describing the arrest of a for-
mer professional football player on charges of urinating in public).
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cedes that security in certain instances can afford important societal advan-
tages.11 6 But if a democratic society thinks that security, stability, and economic
productivity are good things, one would think that it believes they are good
things for all people, not just the privileged propertied class."' In this sense,
perhaps a progressive conception of property is best thought of as reflecting not
only a commitment to plural values but to testing those values with the identity
of property's subjects in mind. Supporting identity considerations calls for dis-
solution of the baseline that private property exists principally to advantage
owners and create market gains, in favor of a system of property that regularly
realigns so that it remains justified in terms of the ways in which it offers wide-
spread benefits to owners and non-owners, in both present and future
generations."s
Some may counter that taking identity into account when fashioning
property standards and resolving property disputes represents a disregard for
uniform application of law that can have a corrosive effect on citizens' respect
for and willingness to follow law. Yet, as noted above, human need and human
stories already have been considered in some instances in the past, and there is
little evidence that such incidents have generated disrespect for the idea of
property more generally." 9 Supporting identity considerations does not auto-
matically call for a wholesale redistribution of property and wealth to the point
of grave risk of systemic instability, but rather only for a context-driven and
non-destructive balance between the forces of stability and justice-inspired
change.1 20
116. Some scholars point out that existing uses need far more protection than prospective, antici-
pated uses, the latter of which do not generate the same widespread economic benefits as the
former. See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra note 100, at 444.
117. Cf Gregory S. Alexander, Constitutionalising Property: Two Experiences, Two Dilemmas, in
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 88, 89-90 (anet McLean ed., 1999).
118. On this theme, see, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in EARLY MODERN
CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 95, 95, 102 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995) (defin-
ing a perception of property as individual absolute dominion as allowing "a single owner[ ]
the rights to enjoy and exploit the owned resources without restriction" and suggesting that
"[fto endow someone with a full private-property right does not increase the sum of security
in the world [but rather] merely redistributes uncertainty away from the owner to those who
will be subject to his rights' exercise"); Mulvaney, supra note 11, at 368; Singer, Reliance
Interest, supra note 95, at 657; Singer, After the Flood, supra note 99, at 289 ("[T]he most
basic foundational insight of moral theory [is] the idea that we must give reasons for our
actions that affect other people.").
119. Underkuffler, Politics ofNeed, supra note 88, at 372-73 ("The idea of property as individual
protection . .. has survived circumstances far more extreme and far more challenging than
the simple, occasional recognition by government of its need-based contingency.").
120. Van der Walt makes such a claim in the context of South Africa's continued attempts to
distance itself from the vestiges of apartheid. See VAN DER WALT, supra note 96, at 7-9
("The idea of transformative constitutionalism does not guarantee certainty or closure on
questions about social, economic, and political reform but, at most, can assist in opening the
debates about them up for further critical analysis and discussion."). If identity considera-
tions do generate disrespect for the idea of property more generally, that does not necessarily
mean they should be disregarded in any event; perhaps, instead, the property regime itself is
in need of a more fundamental alteration.
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Admittedly, explicit considerations of identity are, to date, few and far
between in American property law. 121 Moreover, when such considerations are
evident, they have tended to revolve around squatting, adverse possession, and
tenant-landlord disputes, such that particularly deep challenges remain in terms
of incorporating these considerations into broader areas of property, such as the
more traditional aspects of land use law. However, that they exist at all leaves
room for continuing conversations about their relevance and application. And,
to circle back directly to the original issue at hand here, while legislative exac-
tions highlight broad, structural aspects of a given harm associated with devel-
opment, only administrative exactions allow space to attend to the affected
parties' stories. 122 The next section explores how identity considerations might
manifest themselves in administrative exactions under the shadow of Nollan/
Dolan and takings principles more generally.
2. Identity and Administrative Exactions
The Supreme Court famously noted in Armstrong v. United StateS123 that
the Takings Clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole."124 The indefinite nature of this statement has led
scholars from across the spectrum of philosophical perspectives to cite it favora-
bly.1 25 Yet-and this is where proponents of the statement diverge-interpret-
ing Armstrong's message requires an understanding of just which owners should
be deemed similarly situated and thereby capable of being unfairly singled out
for a burden they should not bear "alone."12 6 On this score, according to Eric
Freyfogle, "[a] lawmaking community can properly subject individual owners to
disparate treatment only when there exist, between or among them, differences
121. Lorna Fox O'Mahony suggests the same is often the case in English property law. See Lorna
Fox O'Mahony, Property Outsiders and the Hidden Politics of Doctrinalism, 67 CURRENT LE-
GAL PROBS. 409, 418-28 (2014).
122. Of course, administrative exactions are just one of many administrative mechanisms by
which identity can be taken into account.
123. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
124. Id. at 49.
125. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 141-42 (1995); Jane B. Baron,
Winding Toward the Heart ofthe Takings Muddle: Kelo, Lingle, and the Public Discourse About
Private Property, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 646-51 (2007); Richard A. Epstein, The
Common Law Foundations of the Takings Clause: The Disconnect Between Public and Private
Law, 30 TOURo L. REv. 265, 280 (2014); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice andjust Compen-
sation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 300-03 (1992); Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special
Interests, 77 VA. L. REv. 1333, 1338 (1991); Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36, 64-65 (1964). See generally Dagan, supra note 91; Frank Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
126. See Thomas Merrill, Essay on Takings: Private Property and the Power ofEminent Domain, by
Richard Epstein, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1561, 1580 ("We are told that the law must treat all
similarly situated persons alike. But what does it mean to be 'similarly situated'?").
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that the community deems meaningful."1 27 Freyfogle goes on to suggest that unac-
ceptable disparate treatment "can arise when a law or act imposes peculiar re-
quirements on a landowner, as well as when a law, uniform on its face, works an
unusual burden because of a landowner's differing circumstances."128
By extension, then, it seems worth considering the possibility that "simi-
larly situated" comparisons are contingent on what the community decides are
the relevant variables for determining which persons or groups traditionally
have been pushed to the periphery of ownership. In this way, evolving commu-
nity understandings of marginalization are themselves an account for identity.
Specifically in the exactions context, this could mean that attaching an exaction
to a marginalized applicant's permit which would be a "usual" exaction to non-
marginalized applicants would work an "unusual burden" on that applicant be-
cause of her marginality, and that therefore a less demanding exaction should
be applied. But it also could mean that imposing an exaction that is more de-
manding than what would be a "usual" exaction to a non-marginal applicant is
appropriate when that would work an unusual burden on impacted third parties
because of those third parties' marginality.
For a simple illustration, imagine that developers Andrew and Barry buy
vacant lots in similarly valued neighborhoods in the same town on the same
date with the intent to build the same model condominiums. The developers'
situations are identical except for the fact that the impacts of the air pollution
stemming from Andrew's project are anticipated to fall on traditionally
marginalized persons, while the impacts of the air pollution stemming from
Barry's project are anticipated to fall on those who are economically and politi-
cally well heeled.129 The idea proffered in this section is that perhaps the town
might be justified in attaching more demanding exactions-say, in the form of
more stringent emissions limitations-to Andrew's permit than Barry's permit
due to the reality that the specific people affected by Andrew's development
find themselves on society's margins. Even though the substance of the impacts
felt by the people affected by Andrew's development are the same as the effects
felt by the people affected by Barry's development, the people affected by An-
drew's development sustain a sharper blow from unchecked emissions; for in-
stance, it is more difficult for them, given their circumstances, to move away
from or purchase equipment to counteract the detrimental effects of the pollu-
tion. In other words, in light of the marginal nature of the people affected by
127. Eric T. Freyfogle, Regulatory Takings, Methodically, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10313, 10314-15
(2001) [hereinafter Freyfogle, Methodically] (emphasis added); see also Eric T. Freyfogle, The
Owning and Takings of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REv. 77, 120 (1995) (asserting that
courts must at all times keep one eye on the community and its evolving norms and expecta-
tions, and mix the values they find there with the heritage and language of the law"); T.
Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and justice, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1714, 1715
(1988) (suggesting that justice could be "not absolute, but relative to the group that reaches a
consensus and to the presuppositions of their discourse").
128. See Freyfogle, Methodically, supra note 127, at 10316 (emphasis added).
129. The impacts of air pollution can fall on residents in the source's vicinity or on residents in
downwind areas significantly far afield. Therefore, the hypothetical does not raise the possi-
bility that a city may be inclined to impose minimal exactions on developers willing to invest
in traditionally marginalized neighborhoods.
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their respective development proposals, Andrew and Barry are not similarly sit-
uated. Therefore, the burden imposed on Andrew might not single Andrew out
for mistreatment but rather be deemed a sensible duty of citizenship.
It would be difficult to reach a similar result through rigid application of
an inelastic legislative exaction formula for at least two reasons. 13 0 First, policies
adopted via legislation cannot be applied retroactively. Therefore, a legislation-
only approach could result in the excessive tailoring of activities that produce a
harm that to some degree can be forecasted, while the infinite harms of specific
development projects that are less predictable go completely unaddressed.
Thoughtfully constructed individualized requirements are more cautious in this
sense, and such nimble mechanisms a seems preferable to homogenous dictates
in at least some circumstances.
Second, a legislative exaction formula might be able to determine a point
of departure for emissions limitations, but the need to increase (or decrease) the
stringency of those limitations in individual situations can be addressed only
through administrative judgment exercised under a context-based standard that
allows for an accounting of the affected parties' circumstances.'31 The modern
movement from strict "Euclidean zoning" to flexible land use regulation that
leaves room for negotiated solutions is instructive on this point. Rigidly apply-
ing uniform rules risks failing to recognize important differences between what,
on a cursory glance, may appear to be similarly situated parcels, when in actual-
ity land is part of a much more complex ecological fabric than the lines of any
subdivision map can suggest. 13 2 Rigid application of uniform rules likewise risks
failing to recognize important differences between what, on a cursory glance,
may appear to be similarly situated people. Case-by-case determinations allow
room to address the fact that development on particular lots will create in par-
ticular ways quite diverse harms that a one-size-fits-all menu of exactions may
130. It is true that, in some instances, the government could via legislation fairly accurately specify
in advance one-size-fits-all monetary, dedication, or conservation requirements for permit
applicants. Select development impacts today, including traffic impacts, are conducive in
some ways to these planning-based, broadly applicable exaction formulas. See, e.g., Fenster,
Constitutional Shadow, supra note 1, at 767; Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 8, at 673.
Still, say, in the wetlands context (much like the air pollution context presented in the hypo-
thetical offered in the text), formulas cannot be too specific in light of the multitude of
variables associated with lost and created/restored wetland functionality that must be consid-
ered in evaluating the adequacy of wetlands mitigation. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 720
n.173; Jonathan Douglas Witten, Carrying Capacity and the Comprehensive Plan: Establishing
and Defending Limits to Growth, 28 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 583, 604-05 (2001).
131. Among the wealth of scholarship addressing the larger general question of differentiating-
and the difficulty of differentiating-between "rules" and "standards" in property law. See
generally Amnon Lehavi, The Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Stan-
dards, 42 RuTGERs L.J. 81 (2010); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40
STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1719 (2004); Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MIcH. L. REv. 1285 (2008); Joseph W. Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property
Law, 46 U.C. DAVIs L. REv 1369 (2013).
132. See, e.g., Ball & Reynolds, supra note 75, at 468; David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an
Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1243, 1301 (1997); Mulvaney, supra note 11, at
364; Serkin, supra note 80, at 1682-83; Singer, supra note 131, at 1407-09.
168 [Vol. 40
Legislative Exactions
be ill fit to counter.' 3 And in terms of subjecting the exaction in this illustration
to the specific Nollan and Dolan nexus and proportionality requirements, there
is little concern: the emissions limitations imposed on Andrew bear an obvious
nexus to his proposed development's emissions and the weight of those limita-
tions are proportionate, in a holistic sense, to the impact the project imposes on
third parties.13 4
Though the above illustration involving Andrew and Barry touts the iden-
tity-related advantages of administrative exactions, it is not offered as part of a
call for mass exercise of administrative powers over legislative ones in the exac-
tions context. Administrative concern for marginalized persons expressed
through imposing a more demanding exaction on the likes of Andrew than on
the likes of Barry cannot serve as a substitute for broader responses by
lawmakers to contemporary environmental and economic challenges. Moreo-
ver, it is of course the case that administrative exactions, if employed haphaz-
ardly, can result in extortion135 or, on the flip side, encourage weak and even
corrupt bargains that allow developers to reap the benefits of their projects
while passing their burdens on to the surrounding community.136 More moder-
ately, this section suggests that perhaps administrative exactions should remain
a tool in regulators' toolbox, to be employed transparently and only in suitable
circumstances. And it would seem that permitting entities generally stand in
the best position to situationally choose the appropriate policy instrument or
decisionmaking process to implement in response to a given or forecasted prob-
lem or harm. Recognizing the legislative-administrative distinction in the exac-
tion-takings context could foreclose the likelihood that the state will choose
133. See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan, Dolan and Municipal Risk Assessment, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
1, 30 (1997) ("[Exaction] formula[s] should have some flexibility of application, so that if
there are particular instances of inequitable application, an administrative process is available
to smooth out the roughness of proportionality."). Of course, there are disadvantages to
administrative solutions, as well. See, e.g., Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Miss-
ing Voices: A Collaborative Modelfor Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive
Planning in Land Use Decisions (pt. 1), 24 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 35-65 (2005) (asserting
that, among other flaws in land-use-regulation models that rely heavily on administratively
negotiated agreements with developers, public participation is limited, decisions are made ad
hoc, and negotiators are not effectively held accountable "to those most impacted by the land
use decision"). The point I seek to make in this paper is not to call for mass case-by-case
administration over legislation in the exactions context, but rather to generate discussion on
the benefits of an approach that allows government officials the ability to choose between
these two policy instruments. On the advantages of imposing exactions via legislation, see,
e.g., Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 8, at 646-47.
134. Nollan and Dolan do not explicitly require that similarly situated permittees be treated the
same, only that the nexus and proportionality strictures are followed in each case. But see
Starr Int'l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 433, 457-60 (2015) (critiquing the federal
government for attaching conditions to AIG's bailout loan that were more stringent than
those attached to bailout loans extended to other entities).
135. Extortion conceivably could be intentional or subconscious. See Jeffrey Rachlinski, Rulemak-
ing Versus Adjudication. A Psychological Perspective, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 529, 542-43
(2005) (suggesting that considering the details of a human story can lead to misleading
judgments or misplaced emotional responses).
136. See, e.g., Dana, supra note 132, at 1261 n.92 ("Formulaic statutes . . . may help prevent
undesirable discrimination by local regulators in favor of politically well-connected develop-
ers and against other developers.").
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administrative exactions over legislative ones, even when doing so would better
promote a progressive conception of property's normative aim of affording
widespread collective benefits.
C. Summary: The Legislative-Administrative Distinction in the Second Order
While I noted in Part I that there are credible first-order reasons for pro-
gressive property scholars to support the legislative-administrative distinction in
the exaction-takings context, I have raised concern in this Part that broad
adoption of the distinction could promote secondary effects that actually im-
pede movement toward accomplishing the goals of a progressive understanding
of property. First, in a functional sense, I have asserted that recognizing the
legislative-administrative distinction in exactions law threatens to uproot some
of the more progressive characteristics of takings jurisprudence, for it could
have spillover effects into the many eminent domain and regulatory takings
situations that involve administrative acts unrelated to exactions. Second-and
more controversially, given its broader theoretical implications-I have con-
tended that formal judicial recognition of the legislative-administrative distinc-
tion could prompt governmental entities to shy away from administrative
exactions in favor of broad, unbending legislative measures in an effort to avoid
the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan. The possible consequences of
such a shift in land use policy are significant, given that administrative exactions
can present an opportunity to more thoroughly consider the human identities of
all parties affected, in very numerous and diverse ways, by new development.
CONCLUSION
Scholarly debate continues on the question of whether the heightened
scrutiny of the Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan and Dolan should be appli-
cable in takings cases involving exactions that result from generally applicable
legislation. Proponents of progressive conceptions of property have strong first-
order reasons to support immunizing legislative exactions from such heightened
scrutiny, reasons that are grounded in the checks and balances of democratic
government, the likelihood of reciprocal advantages stemming from legislation,
and an aversion to judicial usurpation of the legislative process. However, this
Article raises the possibility that distinguishing between legislative and admin-
istrative exactions could produce two secondary effects that ultimately prove
detrimental to progressive property's aims.
First, pressing the idea that administrative exactions are significantly more
likely to abuse property owners than legislative exactions necessarily risks
marginalizing case-by-case administration across the board, which could lead
courts to incorporate the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan in takings
cases involving administrative acts unrelated to exactions. Second, formally rec-
ognizing the legislative-administrative distinction could prompt governmental
entities to shy away from administrative actions in favor of broad, unbending
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legislative measures to avoid heightened scrutiny, and deserting case-by-case
administration can come with weighty social costs, given that it is administra-
tion that at least in certain instances can better respond to varied and unpredict-
able development impacts and invariably focuses attention on the affected
parties' human stories.
It follows that both remaining options in the wake of Nollan, Dolan, and
Koontz-subjecting legislative exactions to either a deferential level of takings
scrutiny or the heightened standard to which administrative exactions currently
are subject-pose significant complications for proponents of progressive con-
ceptions of property. In the end, then, perhaps progressive property scholars
might concentrate more readily on evaluating and advocating for other poten-
tial boundary principles in exaction-takings law,"' or, even more dramatically,
reinvigorate the long dormant and admittedly uphill battle to reverse Nollan
and Dolan in their entirety.3 s
137. The potential alternative boundary principles in exaction-takings law are extensive. See, e.g.,
Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Courts Takings
Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 103, 131 (2001) (exac-
tions imposed in built-out communities versus those imposed in communities with large
amounts of developable land); id. (exactions imposed in communities with "unique ameni-
ties, such as beach towns" versus those imposed in run-of-the-mill towns); Greene, supra
note 43, at *17-18 (land-use exactions versus non-land-use exactions); Pidot, supra note 37,
at 137 (on-site exactions versus off-site exactions); id. at 152-63 (exactions amounting to
fees versus exactions more akin to expenditures); Recent Case, Home Builders Ass'n of
Northern California v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), 115 HARV.
L. REv. 2058, 2062-63 (2002) (exactions constituting takings-on-their-own versus those
that do not).
138. Laura Underkuffler offered some compelling, wide-ranging remarks in this regard in her
keynote address at the Association for Law, Property and Society Annual Conference in
May of 2015. See Underkuffler, supra note 15 (written presentation of remarks).
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